We present a household consumption model that accounts for caring household members, while allowing for noncooperative behavior in decisions on public goods. The intrahousehold consumption outcome critically depends on the degree of caring between the household members. By varying the degree of intrahousehold caring, the model encompasses a whole continuum of household consumption models that are situated between the fully cooperative model and the noncooperative model without caring. This feature is used to define a measure for the degree of cooperation within the household. We also establish a dual characterization of our noncooperative model with caring preferences:
Introduction
Household members care for each other. But, at the same time, they may act noncooperatively when deciding on the publicly consumed goods within the household.
How can we account for this in modeling household consumption behavior? We present a consumption model that can allow for various degrees of caring in the household, while considering possibly noncooperative behavior. More specifically, we assume that household members have caring preferences in the Beckerian sense (also referred to as altruistic preferences by Becker (1981) ). We then model noncooperative behavior by assuming that households choose Nash equilibrium intrahousehold allocations.
Our model fits within the so-called 'non-unitary' approach to analyzing household consumption behavior, which has become increasingly popular in the recent literature. Indeed, there is a growing consensus that multi-member consumption behavior should no longer be modeled as resulting from the maximization of some common household welfare function. This 'unitary' approach to modeling household behavior is methodologically unappealing and leads to testable implications (e.g. income pooling and Slutsky symmetry) that are frequently rejected in empirical studies. Non-unitary household consumption models open the 'black box' of household behavior by taking into account that each household member has her/his own preferences. Consumption decisions are then regarded as the outcome of specific intrahousehold decision processes. In our non-unitary model, the outcome of the household decision process critically depends on the degree of caring between the household members. By varying the degree of intrahousehold caring, the model encompasses a whole continuum of household consumption models that are situated between the fully cooperative model (with Pareto efficient intrahousehold allocations) and the noncooperative model without caring (with Nash equilibrium allocations under noncaring preferences). As such, our model provides a generalized perspective on modeling household consumption with public goods. As we will discuss in Section 2, the cooperative model and the noncooperative model without caring have been welldocumented in the literature. Each model has its own strengths and weaknesses. A main objective of the current study is to develop a consumption model that combines the attractive properties of the cooperative and noncooperative benchmark models, while avoiding the associated weaknesses.
Our consumption model has a number of additional features that are particularly attractive from a theoretical and/or practical perspective. First of all, as we will argue in Section 3, it allows us to define a measure of intrahousehold caring that can also be interpreted as quantifying the degree of within-household cooperation. Specifically, we show that it is possible to quantify and estimate the degree of caring 1 Alderman, Chiappori, Haddad, Hoddinot and Kanbur (1995), Vermeulen (2002) and Donni (2008) provide more elaborate discussions of this topic. For empirical rejections of the unitary model, see for example Lundberg (1988) , Thomas (1990) , Bourguignon, Browning, Chiappori and Lechene (1993), Lundberg, Pollak and Wales (1993), Fortin and Lacroix (1997) , Phipps and Burton (1998), Browning and Chiappori (1998) , Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix (2002) , Duflo (2003) , Vermeulen (2005) and Cherchye and Vermeulen (2008) .
within the household; and this gives us an operational measure for the magnitude of intrahousehold cooperation. We see at least two reasons why it is important to know this degree of intrahousehold cooperation. First, from a welfarist perspective, it gives us an idea of the welfare improvement that is possible within a certain household. If it is possible to link the level of cooperation to household characteristics, we may use this knowledge for welfare enhancement measures that correct the efficiency loss originating from household behavior that is not fully cooperative. Second, the extent of within-household cooperation is also important for the structure of optimal taxation and policies that target to alter the intrahousehold income distribution. 2 In this respect, different (cooperative-noncooperative) consumption models may lead to other intrahousehold allocations.
Another interesting feature of our model pertains to its dual representation, which will be established in Section 4. Specifically, we will show that the noncooperative model with caring preferences is dually equivalent to a noncooperative model with non-caring preferences that is characterized by intrahousehold transfers. In fact, the intrahousehold transfers in the dual model will be directly related to the above mentioned measure of intrahousehold cooperation. This duality result parallels the well-known duality between a Pareto optimal allocation and the Lindahl equilibrium, which is often used to provide a decentralized representation for the fully cooperative (Pareto efficient) model of household consumption. As such, we obtain a similar decentralized representation for our newly proposed model.
A final important aspect of our model relates to its empirical applicability. In Section 5 we will show that, although our newly proposed model generalizes the fully cooperative and noncooperative models, it does have useful testable implications for empirical data. To this end, we present a revealed preference characterization of the model in the tradition of Afriat (1967) and Varian (1982) : we derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the empirical validity of our model that can be checked by solely using a finite set of observed household consumption bundles and corresponding prices. 3 Essentially, this revealed preference characterization directly applies the theoretical implications of our consumption model to the observed household choices. In our opinion, this makes it a natural starting point for investigating the empirical usefulness of this newly proposed model. In this respect, we also indicate that the revealed preference approach has been successfully applied for empirical analysis of non-unitary consumption models: Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2007 Vermeulen ( , 2009 , 2 See, for example, Blundell, Chiappori and Meghir (2005) for discussion of this targeting view on tax policies. Browning, Bourguignon, Chiappori and Lechene (1994), Browning, Chiappori and Lewbel (2006) and Lewbel and Pendakur (2008) focus on alternative welfare-related questions associated with the intrahousehold income distribution in the context of the cooperative consumption model. 3 See also Samuelson (1938) , Houthakker (1950) and Diewert (1973) for seminal contribution to the revealed preference approach to modeling household consumption behavior.
2011) focus on the cooperative model, while Cherchye, Demuynck and De Rock (2011) consider the noncooperative model without caring. In addition, as we will discuss below, this revealed preference approach has some attractive advantages (as compared to the more standard 'differential' approach) for analyzing multi-member household consumption behavior. We will demonstrate the practical usefulness of the revealed preference conditions by means of an illustrative application to data taken from the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS).
The concluding Section 6 will summarize our main results. In addition, it will suggest a number of interesting avenues for follow-up research.
2 Non-unitary models of household consumption: overview Within the non-unitary approach, alternative household consumption models differ from each other in their modeling of the intrahousehold decision process. In particular, we distinguish two main approaches in the existing literature. The first approach assumes that the household members behave cooperatively, which means that they reach a Pareto-optimal allocation, i.e. no household member can increase her/his utility without decreasing the utility of any other member. 4 The second approach assumes noncooperative behavior and excludes intrahousehold caring, i.e. the household consumption allocation is a Nash equilibrium defined in terms of noncaring preferences. 5 In a household consumption setting with both privately and publicly consumed goods, this implies a Nash equilibrium with household members voluntarily contributing to the public goods. It is well known that, in this case, the resulting level of public goods is generally below the cooperative (Pareto efficient) level. Both the cooperative model and the noncooperative model have their own strengths and weaknesses. The defense of the noncooperative model without caring is almost entirely based on its theoretical appeal. In particular, any Nash equilibrium is stable in the sense that no household member can increase her/his utility by unilaterally changing her/his strategy. Moreover, using a backward induction argument, one can show that this stability property remains even if we allow for finitely repeated interaction. 4 See, for example, Apps and Rees (1988), Chiappori (1988 Chiappori ( , 1992 , Browning and Chiappori (1998) and Vermeulen (2007, 2011) . Following Chiappori (1988 Chiappori ( , 1992 , the consumption literature often refers to the cooperative model as the 'collective' model of household behavior.
5 See, for example, Leuthold (1968) , Bourguignon (1984) , Ulph (1988) , Kooreman and Kapteyn (1990) Nevertheless, the noncooperative approach also has some deficiencies. First of all, it seems rather unrealistic -especially in a household setting-to assume that household members only care about their own wellbeing. This calls for including caring preferences. Second, the household is normally viewed as a prime example of an institution that it is very likely to overcome free-rider problems associated with public consumption -at least to some extent. Specifically, one may expect that repeated interaction and (nearly) perfect information increase the probability that household members develop welfare enhancing mechanisms to overrule such problems.
Let us then consider the cooperative model. The premise of efficient behavior can be defended in three ways (see, for example, Browning and Chiappori (1998) ). First of all, under perfect information and with repeated interactions -two conditions that are likely to be satisfied within every household-Pareto optimal allocations can be stable as long as all members are sufficiently patient. Second, the Pareto outcome is seen as a most natural generalization of the assumption of utility maximization in the unitary model with several household members. Finally, Pareto efficiency is widely used as an assumption in cooperative bargaining models. 6 In this sense,
Pareto optimality is a minimal condition that should be satisfied if the intrahousehold bargaining process is based on such a cooperative solution concept. Although we largely agree with these arguments, we also believe that there remains scope for relaxing the efficiency condition. First of all, it is well known that, unless the Pareto optimal allocation exactly coincides with a Nash equilibrium, the cooperative Pareto efficient outcome is not self enforcing. In other words, there will usually be some household member(s) who can increase utility by unilaterally deviating from the Pareto optimal allocation. Second, even if we are in a situation with infinitely repeated interaction, the folk theorem shows that almost every allocation situated between the noncooperative Nash outcome and the Pareto efficient outcome could be stable. In other words, (infinitely) repeated interaction does not necessarily lead to efficient behavior. Finally, the Pareto efficiency assumption has been questioned for the publicly consumed goods. Most notably, it has been argued that the informational requirement and the resulting cost of implementing cooperation may often be unrealistic.
Summarizing, while the fully cooperative model might represent an overly optimistic outlook of the household decision process, we may also argue that the noncooperative model without caring is too pessimistic. Indeed, it appears to us that most households are to be found somewhere between the cooperative and noncooperative benchmarks. As noted by Alderman, Chiappori, Haddad, Hoddinot and Kanbur (1995): '[The household] consists of individuals who -motivated at times by altruism, at times by self interest, and often by both -cajole, cooperate, threaten, help, argue, support, and, indeed, occasionally walk out on each other. ' In this paper, we present a new model of household behavior that encompasses situations between the extreme cases of full cooperation and noncooperation without caring. Formally, our model is equivalent to a noncooperative model where household members have Beckerian caring preferences: each household member optimizes a function that is increasing in the utilities of all household members. 7 In this set-up, we will derive specific testable restrictions for empirical data. Interestingly, we will also demonstrate that it is possible to empirically recover a measure for the degree of intrahousehold cooperation which, as we will explain, actually captures caring within the household. Thus, by introducing caring in the noncooperative framework, our model allows us to combine some attractive properties of the cooperative model and the noncooperative model. At the same time, it solves two main problems associated with the two benchmark models. First of all, as it is based on the concept of a noncooperative Nash equilibrium, it is self enforcing and, hence, stable. Second, by introducing caring between the household members, we depart from the assumption that these members are inherently egoistic (i.e. non-caring). Caring preferences allow for friendship, altruism, love and trust between household members. We believe this assumption to be much more realistic when dealing with institutions like households, where these emotions do play an important role.
As a final remark, it is worth to note that d'Aspremont and Dos Santos Ferreira (2009) provide an alternative household consumption model that is situated between the fully cooperative and the noncooperative model. A most important difference with our model is that these authors model 'semicooperative' behavior by parameterizing the trade-off between an individual budget constraint and the household budget constraint (which evaluates the public goods at Lindahl prices). By contrast, the distinguishing feature of our approach is that it combines caring preferences with noncooperative intrahousehold interaction for modeling the household decision behavior. See also the concluding section for a further comparison between our model and the model of d'Aspremont and Dos Santos Ferreira (in terms of testable implications).
A noncooperative model with caring preferences
We consider a household with two members, A and B. 8 The household decides over the purchase of a bundle of N private goods, denoted by q ∈ R N + , and a bundle of K intrahousehold public goods, denoted by Q ∈ R K + . We remark that this assumes that each good is either private (in q) or public (in Q). Further, it excludes externalities associated with privately consumed quantities. Importantly, however, our setting can actually account for such externalities. Specifically, if an individual is the exclusive consumer of a particular private good, then we can account for externalities for this good by formally treating it as a public good. Throughout, we will treat the first private good as a numeraire and we will assume that the consumption of the numeraire and all public goods is strictly positive in all household equilibria.
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In what follows, we will first formalize our assumptions regarding the preferences and the strategies of the household members. Subsequently, we will formally define and characterize the household equilibrium in terms of our model.
Preferences:
Our analysis starts from a set of decision situations T . In each situation t, the household faces a price vector p t ∈ R N ++ for the private goods, a price vector P t ∈ R K ++ for the public goods, and a household income Y t ∈ R ++ . In addition, members A and B are endowed with situation-dependent concave and increasing (Beckerian) caring functions. We denote these functions by W are situation-dependent. This is a natural assumption in a non-unitary framework. Specifically, it reflects the idea that the degree of caring or altruism between household members might depend on several (situation-dependent) exogenous variables.
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8 This focus on two-member households is mainly to keep the exposition simple. However, our following analysis can readily be extended to households with more than two members. 9 We can relax this assumption by using suitable Lagrange multipliers, but this would only increase notational complexity without adding new insights. In fact, our own empirical application in Section 5 will consider data sets with some components of the public goods equal to zero. 10 Compare with the discussion in Browning, Chiappori and Lechene (2006 In what follows, we will make one additional assumption to facilitate our technical analysis. Specifically, we use a single crossing (SC) property:
, we have that either 
It is standard in the literature on noncooperative household behavior to explicitly distinguish between A and B's contribution to the household's public consumption (e.g. Preston (2005, 2008) , and d'Aspremont and Dos Santos Ferreira (2009) make similar distinctions). However, the fact that we allow A and B to buy private goods for each other may seem a bit unconventional. In most models (of noncooperative behavior) it is assumed that members only buy private goods for themselves, i.e. A chooses q (for M, L ∈ {A, B}, M = L) directly relates to the specificity of our model, i.e. it accounts for caring preferences in a noncooperative setting.
Let us explain this last point in some more detail. In a noncooperative model without caring preferences, it seems intuitive that individual members will not buy private goods for the other. By contrast, in the case of intrahousehold caring, one household member may well benefit from increasing the private consumption of the other member. Our distinction between q M,M t and q M,L t exactly takes this into account.
11 In fact, in many real life situations one household member effectively buys private consumption goods for the other member. Examples are abundant: the wife goes shopping and buys food for everyone and clothes for her husband; the husband fills the car with gasoline while the wife takes the car to go to the gym; etc.
Equilibrium: We will first introduce our new concept of household equilibrium in general terms. Subsequently, we will show that the concept encompasses the fully cooperative equilibrium and the noncooperative equilibrium without caring as limiting cases. This demonstrates the generality of our model. Furthermore, it will enable us to interpret our measure of intrahousehold caring as quantifying the degree of within-household cooperation, i.e. the measure allows us to distinguish between different consumption models characterized by different of degrees of cooperation. We assume that in equilibrium both members maximize their caring functions given the decisions of the other members, i.e. we assume a noncooperative Nash equilibrium. More formally, at decision situation t, member A solves the following optimization problem (OP-A):
An allocation that solves both problems simultaneously is called a household equilibrium with caring. 
Definition 1 An allocation {q
It follows from the proof of this proposition that the values of the indices θ In the next section, we will use the dual representation of our consumption model to provide a specific equilibrium interpretation for the equality condition in Proposition 1.
To further enhance the intuition of our newly proposed model, we consider the two natural benchmark cases, i.e. the fully cooperative model and the noncooperative model without caring. In terms of Definition 1 (and problems OP-A and OP-B), if the caring functions W 
, then the household equilibrium reduces to a noncooperative equilibrium without caring. Our model is general in that it also captures all possible equilibrium situations between the fully cooperative equilibrium and the noncooperative equilibrium without caring Using the same two benchmark models, we can effectively interpret the indices θ and θ
, where all partial derivatives are evaluated at the allocation
In words, θ A t equals the ratio of member B's marginal valuation for a unit increase of the numeraire quantity for member A (which enters the caring function W B t through U A ) relative to his marginal valuation for the same increase of the numeraire quantity for his own (which enters W B t through U B ). Likewise, the variable θ B t equals the ratio of A's marginal valuation for a unit increase of the numeraire quantity for B relative to her marginal valuation for the same quantity increase for her own.
conditions (see, for example, Samuelson (1954) ). And, thus, we get for each public good k: τ
In words, the sum of the members' MWTP must sum to the market prices. This case coincides with θ A t = θ B t = 1 in Proposition 1. We next turn to the noncooperative model. In this case we get the following equilibrium condition for every public good k:
see, for example, Cherchye, Demuynck and De Rock (2011). Thus, this case corresponds to θ . In this respect, we also note that max{θ As a final remark, we note that the values of θ 
A duality result
The second fundamental theorem of welfare economics provides one of the most important theoretical insights related to the concept of Pareto efficiency. Specifically, provided that some regularity conditions are satisfied, any Pareto optimal allocation can be dually characterized in terms of a suitable income distribution and by making use of individual Lindahl prices for the publicly consumed goods (see, for example, Bergstrom (1976) ). This dual characterization of Pareto optimality has often been used to provide a decentralized two-stage representation of the fully cooperative model of household consumption: in the first stage, the household divides the total income over the household members; in the second stage, each individual member chooses a consumption allocation that maximizes her/his utility subject to the personalized budget constraint defined in the first stage.
In this section, we will develop a similar duality result for the noncooperative model with caring preferences that we introduced above: we will show that this model is dually equivalent to a noncooperative model with non-caring preferences that is characterized by intrahousehold transfers. The magnitude of these transfers will be directly related to the MWTP functions τ introduced in the previous section. In turn, this duality result implies a decentralized representation of the model that contains two stages. As we will explain, this representation will provide a further motivation to interpret θ Before formally stating the duality result, we first explain the two stages of the noncooperative household model with transfers. In the first stage, the total household income Y t is divided between A and B, which defines the individual incomes Y . Here, we abstract from explicitly modeling this first step. Similar to our treatment of caring functions in the previous section, this intrahousehold income distribution can be seen as a function of situation-dependent exogenous variables (i.e. the so-called extra-environmental parameters or distribution factors). In the concluding section, we discuss the possibility to more carefully investigate this first step income distribution as an interesting avenue for follow-up research. At this point, we indicate that the idea of an intrahousehold income distribution resembles the so-called 'sharing rule' concept that applies to the fully cooperative model: in the decentralized representation of this model, the sharing equally defines the within-household income distribution underlying the (in casu Pareto efficient) household consumption decisions.
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In the second stage of the allocation process, each household member M (= A or B) decides on the optimal level of her/his own private consumption and the own contribution to the level of public goods, by maximizing her/his own utility U M (q M , Q) subject to a personalized budget constraint defined by the individual income. In doing so, the individual faces the price vectors p t and P t for her/his choice of private consumption q M t and public contribution Q M t . In addition, each individual receives a transfer from the other individual per unit of public good that she/he purchases. We denote these transfers for each public good k by σ 14 In fact, Chiappori (1988 Chiappori ( , 1992 originally introduced this sharing rule concept for the model without public goods. In the literature on the cooperative model, a refinement of the concept that accounts for public goods is the so-called 'conditional' sharing rule. This concept captures how the group shares the income to be spent on private consumption for the given level of public consumption; see, for example, Blundell, Chiappori and Meghir (2005) for discussion. As such, this first step income distribution concept is not fully comparable to ours, which is not conditional on the level of public consumption.
There are at least two interpretations for these intrahousehold transfers related to public goods. First, one can see these transfers as voluntary contributions: as B benefits from the purchase of Q A t,k , it may be the case that she/he is willing to contribute to the purchase of this bundle. Next, one can also interpret them as representing an implicit tax that B has to pay for the benefit of receiving Q A t,k . Both interpretations express that intrahousehold transfers (i.e. a given specification of σ A t and σ B t ) refer to the degree of (voluntary or obligatory) cooperation within the household.
Summarizing, at each decision situation t, member A faces the following dual optimization problem (DOP-A):
Similarly, B solves (DOP-B):
It is easy to see that the two budget constraints add up to the household budget constraint at equilibrium (i.e. p t q t + P t Q t ≤ Y t ). Importantly, the noncooperative model under study does not explicitly consider caring preferences: in contrast to the model discussed in the previous section, the problems DOP-A and DOP-B do not include the caring functions W A t and W B t but only use the 'egoistic' functions U A and U B . However, as we will explain, our following concept of a household equilibrium with transfers accounts for caring preferences in an indirect way. 
Definition 2 An allocation {q
In this definition, an equilibrium household allocation requires that each member M 's intrahousehold transfer related to public good k (σ
The factor of proportionality is giving by the index θ M t . Definition 2 establishes a direct link between the noncooperative model with caring introduced in the previous section (with problems OP-A and OP-B) and the two-stage allocation process discussed here (with problems DOP-A and DOP-B).
In the previous section, we argued that the curvatures of the caring functions W 
Using Definition 2, we get the following first order conditions for DOP-A and DOP-B with respect to the public good k:
This condition is identical to the equilibrium condition in Proposition 1. However, the underlying interpretation is different, because we now start from the optimization problems DOP-A and DOP-B rather than OP-A and OP-B.
By considering θ 
, Q t ) > P t,k then the total amount that A is willing to spend for an additional unit of public good k (i.e. A's MWTP plus the fraction θ B t of B's MWTP) exceeds the price A has to pay (i.e. P t,k ). In this case, A will effectively increase her holdings of good k. A directly analogous interpretation applies to the situation τ
or B (whoever contributes positively to good k) will want to decrease her/his contribution to k. Again, this implies a disequilibrium situation.
We are now in a position to establish the dual equivalence result mentioned above. Specifically, the following proposition implies that the household model with caring and the household model with transfers are empirically indistinguishable.
Proposition 2 Let U
A and U B be a pair of utility functions. Then, the following holds for any decision situation t: 
Testable implications
So far, we have focused on the theoretical properties of our household model with caring (or, equivalently, with transfers). In this section, we show that the model has useful testable implications for empirical data. Specifically, we will focus on testable conditions in terms of revealed preferences. As indicated in the introduction, this revealed preference approach has been successfully applied for empirical analysis of non-unitary consumption models. In addition, recent methodological advances of Crawford (2003, 2008) greatly enhanced the empirical usefulness of this revealed preference approach.
In the household consumption literature, empirical studies usually build on a differential characterization (rather than a revealed preference characterization) of household consumption models. The specific feature of this differential approach is that it focuses on properties of functions representing household consumption behavior (e.g. cost, indirect utility and demand functions), 15 whereas the revealed preference approach (only) uses a finite set of household consumption observations. In this respect, Cherchye, De Rock and Demuynck (2011) point out that the revealed preference approach has some attractive features as compared to the more common differential approach for analyzing non-unitary consumption behavior. Most notably, contrary to existing results for the differential approach, the revealed preference characterization of the noncooperative model (without caring) is independent from (or non-nested with) the characterization of the cooperative model: a set of observations that satisfies the cooperative conditions does not necessarily satisfy the noncooperative conditions, and vice versa. More generally, this implies that models characterized by different degrees of intrahousehold cooperation (or caring) are independent of each other in terms of their revealed preference characterization. Clearly, this independence makes it interesting to compare the empirical validity of the different models. This is particularly relevant in the present context, as our empirical exercise will carry out such a comparison.
In our empirical exercise, we will apply the revealed preference conditions to analyze data taken from the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS). This application will demonstrate the practical relevance of the household model with caring. In addition, it will show that the revealed preference conditions allow us to recover the indices θ A t and θ B t , which -to recall-capture the degree of intrahousehold cooperation for behavior that is consistent with the model.
Revealed preference characterization:
We start from a finite set of |T | observed decision situations (or 'observations'), i.e. S = {p t , P t ; q t , Q t } t∈T . We remark that this implies minimal conditions on what is observed. In particular, we assume that at each observation t we only observe the price vectors p t and P t and the household consumption bundles q t and Q t .
Given our discussion in the previous sections, we consider the following definition of rationalizability.
Definition 3 Consider a data set S = {p t , P t ; q t , Q t } t∈T . We say that S is ratio- Before providing testable revealed preference conditions for rationalizability, we briefly recapture a result of Varian (1982; based on Afriat, 1967) . Consider a finite set of |L| observations, i.e. a set Z = {w l ; x l } l∈L containing price vectors w l and quantity vectors x l . Then, we say that this set Z can be rationalized by a utility function U if each quantity bundle x l maximizes the function U in the following sense:
Varian (1982) has shown that such a rationalizing utility function U exists if and only if the set Z satisfies the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP).
Definition 4 Consider a set
there exist a sequence r, . . . , t (with r, . . . , t ∈ L)
Using Definition 4, we can characterize a data set S that is rationalizable with caring.
Proposition 3 Consider a data set S = {p t , P t , q t , Q t } t∈T . The following conditions are equivalent:
1. The data set S = {p t , P t , q t , Q t } t∈T is rationalizable with caring. The explanation is as follows. The restriction S.1 requires the individual consumption bundles for the private goods to sum to the demanded household bundle of private goods. The restriction S.2 corresponds to the equilibrium condition for the public goods k in Proposition 1 (for a positive consumption of the public good k). Condition S.3 states that rationalizability implies a GARP condition at the level of individuals A and B, which corresponds to the existence of the individual utility functions U A and U B in Definition 3. The specificity of our model is that these (2011)). The attractive feature of the MIP characterization is that it allows for checking consistency of a given data S with the conditions in Proposition 3. In the spirit of Varian (1982) , we refer to this as 'testing' data consistency with the model under study.
For all decision situations t and public goods k there exist indices θ
q A t + q B t = q t , (S.1) max τ A t,k + θ B t τ B t,k , τ B t,k + θ A t τ A t,k = P t,
GARP conditions use MWTP vectors (τ
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More specifically, we demonstrate in Appendix B that all constraints of the MIP formulation are linear for fixed θ are independent of t will simplify our presentation of the empirical results. The underlying assumption is that the degree of intrahousehold cooperation does not change over the observations. It is possible to relax this assumption, but this would come at the cost of a considerable increase of the computational complexity of the testable MIP conditions. If observed behavior is consistent with our model with caring (i.e. the set S is rationalizable with caring), then a natural next question pertains to recovering/identifying structural features of the decision model that underlies the (rationalizable) observed consumption behavior. In our application, we will illustrate recovery/identification of values for θ A and θ B (assuming θ A t = θ A and θ B t = θ B for all t; see above) that are consistent with a rationalization of a given set S. Given our discussion in the preceding sections, these values can be interpreted in terms of intrahousehold cooperation (or caring) that is revealed in the observed consumption behavior. Other recovery questions may pertain to the MWTP values τ at equilibrium (in terms of the household model with transfers; see Definition 2). Generally, such recovery can start from the MIP methodology presented in this paper. In this respect, we can refer to Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2011), who consider these questions for the cooperative model; their analysis is directly extended to the noncooperative model with caring discussed here. These authors' basic argument is that revealed preference recovery on the basis of an MIP characterization of rational behavior boils down to defining feasible sets characterized by the MIP constraints.
As for recovery of the individual income shares, one important final remark pertains to restrictions S.4 and S.5 in Proposition 3. As we will explain below, these restrictions imply that the shares Y A t and Y B t that underlie observed (rationalizable) behavior are not identifiable in general. This contrasts with the cooperative case in which the within-household income distribution (in general) can be identified from the observed set S. This identifiability result does not generally hold under noncooperative behavior with caring. As a matter of fact, this identifiability problem for our model actually parallels a similar problem for the noncooperative model without caring.
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To see the identifiability problem, we first note that the budget constraints in DOP-A and DOP-B imply
Thus, because of conditions S.4 and S.5 we obtain that Y 
In terms of the noncooperative model without caring, this last situation would conform to the so-called separate spheres concept.
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On the other hand, as soon as there is one public good k to which both individuals contribute for some t (i.e. τ 
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Empirical Illustration: To demonstrate the practical usefulness of the revealed preference conditions in Proposition 3, we provide a brief empirical illustration. and Y B t that are consistent with a rationalization with caring of the given data set. These bounds then account for the total (non-assignable) expenditures on the jointly contributed public goods.
Specifically, we consider an application of our rationalizability restrictions to data taken from the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS). Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2009 Vermeulen ( , 2011 conducted a revealed preference analysis of these data in terms of the cooperative model, while Cherchye, Demuynck and De Rock (2011) analyzed consistency with the noncooperative model without caring. For compactness, we refer to these authors for a detailed discussion of the data. We extend these earlier studies by analyzing the same data in terms of our noncooperative model with caring.
The data set consists of 148 adult couples, with both (female and male) household members employed. For each separate household, the data set has 8 (= |T |) observations (prices and quantities) on 21 nondurable goods: 3 public goods and 18 private goods (K = 3 and N = 18). 20 Each household is considered separately, which avoids (debatable) preference homogeneity assumptions across males or females of different households. As such, the degree of cooperation may vary for different households. As for each individual household, we assume the degree of intrahousehold cooperation is constant over all observed decision situations, i.e. we consider θ To focus our discussion, we directly build on an empirical finding of Cherchye, Demuynck and De Rock (2011). Starting from the original sample with 148 households, these authors identified two households (1 and 2) that seem particularly interesting to illustrate the empirical usefulness of our newly proposed model: household 1 can be rationalized in terms of the noncooperative model but not in terms of the cooperative model, and household 2 can be rationalized in terms of the cooperative model but not in terms of the noncooperative model. For ease of exposition, we will only report rationalizability results for these two households. 20 The public goods are (1) wood fuel, (2) gas fuel and (3) housing rent. The private goods are (1) food outside the home, (2) clothing, (3) car fuel, (4) luxury goods, (5) services, (6) bread, (7) potatoes, (8) vegetables, (9) fruit, (10) meat, (11) dairy products, (12) fat, (13) sugar, (14) eggs, (15) Generally, using assignable information enhances the power of the empirical analysis. However, strictly speaking it is not needed for such empirical analysis to be possible (e.g., the testable conditions in Proposition 3 do not require such information). 21 Results for other households are available upon request.
the extent to which observed household consumption behavior is characterized by (limited) intrahousehold cooperation. For example, for household 1 consistency with the rationalizability conditions in Proposition 3 holds if θ A , θ B ≤ 0.6 (conditional on the grid search that we conducted). Similarly, for household 2 rationalizability holds if θ A ≥ 0.6 and θ B ≥ 0.4.
In fact, these results show that the degree of cooperation in the household equilibrium may vary across households (e.g. households 1 and 2 are characterized by different values for θ A and θ B ) and household members (e.g. θ A and θ B have different values for household 2). In our opinion, an interesting following step can relate these findings on (varying) intrahousehold cooperation to specific characteristics of the household and/or household members. Such an exercise falls beyond the scope of the current study (also because of limited data availability). But the results in Table 1 clearly suggest that our model with caring (and the corresponding revealed preference conditions) provides a useful theoretical basis for empirically addressing this type of questions. Apart from test results, Table 1 also provides power estimates for the two households and the rationalizability tests that we consider (corresponding to different combinations of θ A and θ B ). Indeed, discriminatory power is often conceived as an important consideration to evaluate a particular behavioral model, and to compare different models, in terms of practical usefulness. In our specific context, it therefore seems interesting to compare the power of consumption models characterized by different degrees of intrahousehold cooperation. For a given data set, power quantifies the probability of detecting (simulated) behavior that is not consistent with the behavioral model subject to testing; we will refer to such inconsistent behavior as 'random' behavior. In our application, we simulate random behavior by using a bootstrap method. 22 For each household, we simulate 1000 random series of eight consumption choices by constructing, for each of the eight observed household budgets, a random quantity bundle exhausting the given budget (for the corresponding prices); we construct these random quantity bundles by drawing budget shares (for the 21 goods) from the set of 1184 (= 148 x 8) observed household choices in the original data set. The power measure is then calculated as one minus the proportion of the randomly generated consumption series that are consistent with the model under evaluation. By using this bootstrap method, our power assessment gives information on the expected distribution of violations under random choice, while incorporating information on the households' actual choices. From Table 1 , we learn that, for both households under study, the power is about the same for the different combinations of θ A and θ B that we consider. In fact, the power of 'intermediate' models with θ A , θ B ∈ [0, 1] is generally closely similar to the power of the 'extreme' fully cooperative and noncooperative models (with, respectively, θ A = θ B = 1 and θ A = θ B = 0) . In our opinion, this provides an empirical motivation for considering non-unitary models with various degrees of cooperation when analyzing household consumption behavior. In some cases, a household model with limited intrahousehold cooperation may provide a better description of the actual household consumption behavior than models with full or without any cooperation.
[ Table 1 about here]
Conclusion
We have presented a model for analyzing household consumption behavior that simultaneously accounts for caring preferences and noncooperative behavior in decisions on public goods. Interestingly, by varying the degree of intrahousehold caring, the model encompasses a whole continuum of household consumption models situated between the fully cooperative model and the noncooperative model without caring. Attractively, our newly proposed model also allowed us to define a measure for the degree of intrahousehold cooperation. Following a revealed preference approach, we derived the testable implications of the model for empirical data. We have illustrated our theoretical discussion through an empirical application to RLMS data. This application suggested the empirical relevance of considering a noncooperative model with caring in addition to the fully cooperative model and the noncooperative model without caring. In addition, it demonstrated the possibility to empirically recover our measure for the degree of cooperation within a particular household. We see at least three interesting directions for follow-up research. First, in the (two-stage) dual representation of our model as characterized by intrahousehold transfers (see Section 4), we have taken the (first stage) intrahousehold income distribution as exogenously given. In this respect, we recall that the methodology presented in Section 5 effectively allows for recovering the income distribution associated with observed household behavior that is found to be consistent with our model. A natural following step of the analysis may relate this income distribution to different (household or member specific) factors that impact on it. In fact, such research would be similar in spirit to existing research focusing on 'distribution factors' in the context of the cooperative model of household consumption. See, for example, Bourguignon, Browning and Chiappori (2009) for a recent discussion of testable implications (for this cooperative model) that are induced by distribution factors.
Second, in Section 5 we have adopted a revealed preference approach to establish the testable implications of the newly proposed model. Because this revealed preference approach directly applies the theoretical implications of our model to the observed consumption behavior, we believe it is natural to adopt this approach as a first assessment tool for the empirical applicability of our newly proposed consumption model. In addition, as we have discussed, this revealed preference approach has proven to be particularly successful for empirical analysis of non-unitary consumption models. Furthermore, we have argued that the approach has a number of attractive features as compared to the more traditional differential approach to characterizing non-unitary consumption models. However, we also believe that an interesting extension of the results in this paper consists of developing the differential counterparts of the conditions presented in Section 5. Such an extension would complement existing results for the cooperative model (see Browning and Chiappori (1998) , Ekeland (2006, 2009 ) and Donni (2009)) and the noncooperative model without caring (see Preston (2005, 2008) ). In this respect, a fruitful starting point may be the study of d'Aspremont and Dos Santos Ferreira (2009), who consider a differential characterization of an alternative model that is situated between the fully cooperative and noncooperative models. Finally, we have considered a static framework, and abstracted from dynamic (or intertemporal) considerations in household consumption behavior. Clearly, developing a static model provides a logical first step towards defining a dynamic model. For example, if one assumes intertemporal separability of consumption decisions, then data consistency with the static model is a necessary condition for data consistency with any dynamic model. As for establishing a dynamic model of noncooperative household consumption with caring preferences, one may usefully combine the insights of this paper with the approach developed in Mazzocco (2007) , who focused on fully cooperative household behavior. As for establishing the associated revealed preference testable conditions, one may fruitfully build on the analysis in Browning (1989) and Crawford (2010) , who considered intertemporal consumption behavior in a unitary framework. 23 In this respect, an important difference between our model and the model of d'Aspremont and Dos Santos Ferreira is that our model uses information (e.g. MWTP) for quantities that are effectively observed (i.e. the equilibrium bundles), while the alternative model of d'Aspremont and Dos Santos Ferreira requires information for quantities in some unobserved cooperative equilibrium (associated with the same observation, i.e. prices and income). For example, the fact that our model only uses observable quantity information allowed us to reformulate the revealed preference characterization in Proposition 3 in MIP terms. As far as we can see, it is not possible to obtain a similar MIP formulation for the revealed preference characterization of the model of d'Aspremont and Dos Santos Ferreira, precisely because this model requires unobservable quantity information.
Appendix A: proofs Proof of Proposition 1
The first order conditions for OP-A and OP-B with respect to the numeraire (i.e. the first private good) and public goods k are
with λ A t and λ B t the Lagrange multipliers of the respective budget constraints. We start from the following observations:
• Either (1) or (2) must hold with equality. This follows from the fact that q A t,1 is strictly positive.
• Either (3) or (4) must hold with equality. This follows from the fact that q B t,1 is strictly positive.
• Either (5) or (6) must hold with equality. This follows from the fact that Q t,k is strictly positive.
• Not both (1) and (4) have strict inequality.
Proof. We prove ad absurdum. Suppose both (1) and (4) hold with strict inequality, then by the first two observations above, it must be that (2) and (3) hold with equality. Then, dividing condition (1) by (2) gives:
, while dividing (3) by (4) gives:
These two inequalities impose that:
This contradicts Assumption SC.
The above reasoning gives us three possible cases: (i) both (1) and (3) hold with equality, (ii) both (1) and (4) hold with equality, (iii) both (2) and (4) hold with equality.
Case (i) In this case, equation (5) can be rewritten as
Further, we have that,
The inequality in (8) follows from using conditions (2) and (4). The inequality in (9) follows from (7). As one of the two conditions (5) or (6) must hold with equality, we have that that τ
, Q t ) = P t,k . As k was arbitrary, this holds for every public good. Setting θ Case (ii) For this case, we can rewrite conditions (5) and (6) as:
and,
As one of these two conditions must hold with equality, we have that:
where
The inequality in (11) follows from dividing condition (2) by (1) while the inequality in (12) follows from dividing condition (3) by (4).
Case(iii)
This case is analogous to case (i) and is left to the reader.
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof of statement 1
Assume that for each decision situation t we have that {q Before we begin, consider the first order condition for A and B with respect to the nth private good for A (i.e. the quantities q A,A t,n and q B,A t,n ):
Lemma 1 
, a contradiction. A similar reasoning holds for the second part of the Lemma. Let us now consider the three relevant cases that were also considered in the proof of Proposition 1:
Case (i) In this case, we set θ 
To obtain a contradiction, let us consider an allocation (q A , Q A ) such that
and, 
The first inequality follows from Lemma 1 and the fact that condition (5) must hold with equality for case (i). The second inequality follows from the budget constraint and gives us the desired contradiction.
Case (ii) In this case, we define θ (11) and (12) and we define
One can easily see that for case (ii),
Now, assume on the contrary that there exist an allocation (q A , Q A ) such that
Then, by concavity of U A , we have that:
Again, we have a contradiction.
Case (iii) For this last case, we define θ 
Assume, on the contrary, that there exist an allocation (q A , Q A ) such that
Again, by concavity of U A , we have that:
The equality follows from Lemma (1) and the fact that condition (6) must hold with equality for case (iii). This concludes the proof for individual A. The proof for individual B is analogous.
Proof of statement 2
Now assume that for each decision situation t there exist indices θ 
In this construction, µ 
This gives,
The first inequality follows from concavity of the functions U A and U B . The first equality follows from the first order conditions of programs DOP-A and DOP-B for the private goods. The second inequality follows from the fact that θ B t ≤ 1, the first order conditions of DOP-A for the public goods and the fact that τ
Proof of Proposition 3
1⇒2. The data set S = {p t , P t , q t , Q t } t∈T is rationalizable with caring. Because of Proposition 2, we have for any decision situation t that the household allocation solves DOP-A and DOP-B. As before, let U 
The inequalities are replaced by equalities in case the quantities of the goods under consideration are strictly positive. Next, concavity of the utility functions U A and
For all t, define U 
To see that this obtains S.3, we make use of the Afriat Theorem (see Afriat (1967) and Varian (1982) ). Specifically, the inequalities in (15)- (16) 
Then, define the functions U
A and U B such that: 
